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[1986] Striker, G. - Origins of the concept of natural law.pdf

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[1986] Striker, G. - Origins of the concept of natural law.pdf

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[1986] Striker, G. - Origins of the concept of natural law.pdf

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文档介绍:Phillip Mi/Sis
Chapter Four
from within the dialoque itself, we should hesitate in Origll1s of the Concept of Natufii' Law
attributing these questionable ontological moves to Plato.
Gisela Striker1
In conclusion, if, as Sayre argues, Plato is attempting to describe
the generation of particulars and to devise methods for exploring
their status, we would have to attribute to the Philebus not only
serious confusions about problems of individuation, but also a
misleading and almost perverse silence about sensible parti•
cuars. If the Philebus is really meant to ing esoterica,
we also must account for Plato's extreme hesitation or, perhaps, The puzzle that has led me to put together the story that follows
diffidence in announcing the news in print. Some might argue is, I think, one that will be familiar to every reader of early modern
that there is much to blush about in the esoteric doctrines, and philosophy: what is natural about the Natural Law?
that fact alone might be enough to account for Plato's apparent The term "natural law" refers, it would seem, to the rules of
caution in the dialogue. But diffidence and caution are not traits morality conceived of as a kind of legal system, but one that has
we easily associate with Plato and for that reason, perhaps, it is not been enacted by any human legislator. By contrast to human
better to read the Philebus in light of Plato's solid and more legal codes, the natural law is supposed to be valid indepen -
readily identifiable epistemological projects in the late dialogues, dently of any formal procedures, and such that it cannot be
rather than to see a radically new shift to esoteric doctrines, changed. BeSides, this law is supposed to provide the standards
whose aims or justification we can only guess at. by which human legislation is to be judged - laws will be just or
unjust depending on whether they do or do not conform to
natural law. This is, at an