文档介绍：外文翻译原文:FinancialReportingandSupplementalVoluntaryDisclosuresAstandardresultinthevoluntarydisclosureliteratureisthatwhenthemanager’sprivateinformationisasignalcorrelatedwiththefirm’sliquidationvalue,,weassumethatthemanager’,’(correlatedwithfirmvalue)aschangesinthefirm’,anincreaseinmandatorydisclosureisgenerallyinterpretedaseitheradecreaseinthemarket’spriorvarianceofthefirm’sliquidationvalueor,morerecently,asthereleaseofanadditionalsignalcorrelatedwiththefirm’,thefirstmainresultinthisliteratureisthatanincreaseinmandatorydisclosureleadstoadecreaseintheprobabilityofvoluntarydisclosure(.,mandatoryandvoluntarydisclosuresaresubstitutes).Thesecondmainresultisthatthemanager’svoluntarydisclosuredecisiondoesnotdependontheinformationinthemandatorydisclosure(.,whetheritcontainsgoodorbadnews).,weassumethatshehasprivateinformationthemarketcanusetobetterestimatethevalueimplicationsofthecontentofthefirm’,plements,ratherthansubstitutesfor,’sprivateinformationinthiswayallowsustoexaminehowthecontentofthefirm’sfinancialreports(whethertheycontaingoodorbadnews)