文档介绍：原文一:
A Model of Intertemporal Emission Trading,
Banking, and Borrowing
This paper provides a general treatment of emission trading, banking, and borrowing in an intertemporal, continuous-time model. Using optimal-control theory, the decentralized behaviorof firms is shown to lead to the least-cost solution attainable under joint-cost solutions for the time paths of emissions and permit prices are derived whenfirms are allowed to both bank and borrow and when firms are only allowed to bank emissionpermits. The policy implications of emission banking and borrowing are discussed.
1. INTRODUCTION
Marketable emission permits are an economic instrument used to attain apredetermined level of environmental quality. The basic concept behind emissiontrading, originated by Dales[5], is a simple one. Initially, a regulatory agency limitsthe overall level of emissions, either by setting a standard or allocating emissions,and then it allows firms to trade their emission allocations or surplus permits. It isnow widely agreed among economists that marketable emission permits can be acost-effective strategy for controlling environmental pollutants, and an extensive
literature on their properties has developed.( see Tietenberg[12] and Cropper andOates[4] for thorough reviews). This work has identified three sources of potentialcost savings: emission trading between firms, emission averaging between sourceswithin a firm, and emission trading through time. mon reference tothese ponents, previous theoretical and empirical research has focusedalmost exclusively on the first two items, trading and averaging.
The small amount of research into emission banking and borrowing is regrettablesince public policymakers have already begun to incorporat
e banking andborrowing rules into law. For example, the banking (and trading) of sulfur dioxideis now authorized by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, and California allowsmanufacturers of passenger cars to bank (and