文档介绍：该【金融市场学双语题库及答案(第二十六章)米什金《金融市场与机构》 】是由【小屁孩】上传分享，文档一共【28】页，该文档可以免费在线阅读，需要了解更多关于【金融市场学双语题库及答案(第二十六章)米什金《金融市场与机构》 】的内容，可以使用淘豆网的站内搜索功能，选择自己适合的文档，以下文字是截取该文章内的部分文字，如需要获得完整电子版，请下载此文档到您的设备，方便您编辑和打印。:..FinancialMarketsandInstitutions,8e(Mishkin))SavingsbanksA)))wereveryconservativewiththeirfunds,)):DTopic::PreviousEdition2)Whichofthefollowingstatementsaboutmutualsavingsbanksaretrue?A)))):DTopic::PreviousEdition3)Whichofthefollowingstatementsconcerningthemutualformofownershipofsavingsbanksaretrue?A)entuatestheprincipal-)Morecapitalisavailable,)Managersofmutualsavingsbanksaremoreriskaversethaninthecorporateform,)):DTopic::PreviousEdition4)SavingsandloanassociationsA)))heldabout85percentoftheirassetsintheformofmortgagespriortotheGreatDepression.:..D)):DTopic::PreviousEdition5)SavingsandloansassociationsA)))didnotweathertheGreatDepressionwell,asthousandsofS&)):DTopic::PreviousEdition6)ThriftsA)fueledthehome-buildingboomfrom1934-)))):ETopic::PreviousEdition7)Thriftssufferedproblemsinthe1970sasA))))):ETopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition8)Intheearlystagesofthebankingcrisisinthe1980s,financialinstitutionswereespeciallyhurtbyA)thesharpincreasesininterestratesfromlate1979until1981.:..B)thesevererecessionin1981-)thesharpdeclineinthepricelevelfrommid-)):ETopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition:..9)Intheearlystagesofthebankingcrisisinthe1980s,financialinstitutionswereespeciallyharmedbyA))thesevererecessionin1981-)thedisinflationfrommid-):BTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition10)Savingsandloanslostatotalof$10billionin1981-binationofrisinginterestratesin1979-1981andA)therecessionof1981-)))elerationofinflationin1981-:ATopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition11)Inthe1980s,thriftinstitutions,whichhadbeenalmostentirelyrestrictedtomakingloansforhomemortgagesonly,wereallowedbyregulatorstoA))))):DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition12)Thegovernmentgrantedthriftsgreaterpowersintheearly1980sinhopesofturningtheindustry'))encouragedthriftstoexpandlendingrapidlyinrealestate,)plexityofthriftlendingactivitiesthatwentbeyondwhatregulatorscouldeffectivelymonitor,)):D:..Topic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition:..13)WhennearlyhalfoftheS&worthandwerethusinsolventbytheendof1982,regulatorsadoptedapolicyof________,)regulatoryforbearance;raisingB)regulatoryforbearance;loweringC)regulatorystringency;raisingD)regulatorystringency;loweringAnswer:BTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition14))regulatoryforbearance;moralhazardB)regulatoryforbearance;adverseselectionC)regulatorystringency;moralhazardD)regulatorystringency;adverseselectionAnswer:ATopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition15)Whichofthefollowingreasonsexplainwhyfederalregulatorsadoptedapolicyofregulatoryforbearancetowardinsolventfinancialinstitutionsintheearly1980s?A)TheFSLIClackedsufficientfundstocoverinsureddepositsintheinsolventS&)))):DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition16))contributedtodecliningprofitabilityintheS&LindustryandanincreaseintheD))didonlyAandBoftheabove.:..Answer:DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition:..17))hadtheadvantageofbenefitinghealthyS&LsbygivingthemtheopportunitytoD)):DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition18)Whichofthefollowingarereasonsthatexplainwhyregulatorspursuedapolicyofregulatoryforbearancetowardthriftsintheearly1980s?A)RegulatorsknewthattheFSLICdidnothavesufficientfundstocloseinsolventS&)))):DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEditionA))))):DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEditionA)))drovedowntheprofitabilityofsolventS&Ls,threateningtoturnthemintoD))didonlyAandBoftheabove.:..Answer:DTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition:..21)Accordingtothetext,petitiveEqualityinBankingActof1987A))failedtoprovidethefundsnecessarytocloseailingS&Ls,):CTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition22)petitiveEqualityinBankingActof1987A))):CTopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition23)petitiveEqualityinBankingActof1987A)providedinsufficientfundstotheFSLICtoclosedowninsolventS&)actuallydirectedS&Lregulatorstocontinuetopursueregulatoryforbearance,furtherdelayingtheclosingofinsolventS&)createdanewagency,theResolutionTrustCorporation,)):ETopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition24)petitiveEqualityinBankingActof1987includedA)expandingtheresponsibilitiesoftheFDIC,)))):C:..Topic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition:..25)petitiveEqualityinBankingActof1987includedA))transferringtheregulatoryroleoftheFederalHomeLoanBankBoardtotheOfficeofThriftSupervision,))):ETopic::TheThriftCrisisQuestionStatus:PreviousEdition26)ounderstandA)whypoliticianshamperedtheeffortsofthriftregulators,)))):DTopic::PreviousEdition27)ounderstandA)whypoliticiansaidedtheeffortsofthriftregulators,))):CTopic::PreviousEdition:..28)ThepoliticaleconomyoftheS&Lcrisisshowsthattheprincipal-,theagent-regulatorsdidnotacttoprotecttheprincipal-taxpayersbecauseA)regulatorswantedtoescapeblame,)regulatorsrespondedtopressuretopursueregulatoryforbearancefrompoliticianseptedcampaigndonationsfromownersofS&)CongresswasunwillingtoallocatethenecessaryfundsregulatorsneededtocloseinsolventS&)):DTopic::PreviousEdition29))regulators'desiretoescapeblameforpoorperformance,leadingtoaperverseB)regulators'edetopressuresimposedbypoliticians,)Congress')):DTopic: