文档介绍：该【从信息披露看企业内部控制外文翻译文献 】是由【1781111****】上传分享，文档一共【11】页，该文档可以免费在线阅读，需要了解更多关于【从信息披露看企业内部控制外文翻译文献 】的内容，可以使用淘豆网的站内搜索功能，选择自己适合的文档，以下文字是截取该文章内的部分文字，如需要获得完整电子版，请下载此文档到您的设备，方便您编辑和打印。:..:文献标题:Regulationbydisclosure:thecaseofinternalcontrol(从信息披露规则角度看企业内部控制)国外作者:,MichaelPage文献出处:《JournalofManagement&Governance》,2010,14(4):409-433字数统计:英文2253单词,12476字符;中文3543汉字外文文献:Regulationbydisclosure::,—,,,thepaniestomakedisclosuresrelatingtorisksandfuture:..:.()Thediscussionpaper“RiskManagementandInternalControlintheEU”statesthat:…ifregulationisnecessary,thendisclosureofinformationshouldbethepreferredregulatorytoolbecauseitputspowerinthehandsofshareholdersandmarketsratherthanleavingitentirelywithregulators(ptablesEuropeens2005,)Disclosureisthusseentobebeneficialfromthreelinkedandoverlappingperspectives:ountabilityandtheexerciseofgoodcorporategovernanceonbehalfofstakeholders;inenablingbetterinvestmentdecisionsandthesmoothrunningofcapitalmarkets;,,theUKapproachtocorporatelegislationhasbeensignificantlydifferent:recognitionofthisdifferencehasbeenheightenedinmuchoftherecent?(Bush2005).'softer'approach,plyorexplain5,underwhichdisclosureofinformationesmandatory,—thecontentofthedisclosuresthemselves-,,missionwhowrotein1967that:Disclosureisthemostrealisticmeansofcopingwiththeever-presentproblemof:..,perhapsequallyimportant,ethicalbehaviour-andwisecounselling-,anditspossibilityalways,-regulatoryapproachestoconflictproblemsandistheclearestalternativetogreatergovernmentalorinstitutionalintervention.[Cary1967:408]Althoughstatementssuchasthoseaboveidentifydisclosureasaregulatorytool,Cary'-thatrelatingtointernalcontrol-inaontext-thatoftheUK'plyorexplain”(ICAEW)published“InternalControl:binedCode”[InternalControlWorkingParty(TheTurnbullReport)1999].ItwaspreparedbyanInternalControlWorkingPartychairedbyNigelTurnbullandisoftenreferredtoas“theTurnbullreport”or“theTurnbullguidance”.TheFinancialReportingCouncillatersetuptheTurnbullReviewGroupwhichpublishedrevisedguidancein2005(TurnbullReviewGroup2005).AlmostsimultaneouslyICAEWpublishedabriefingdocument“ImplementingTurnbull-aBoardroomBriefing”(JonesandSutherland1999).'boilerplate'(;BerettaandBozzolan2004;;LinsleyandShrives2005)whichhavesoughttomeasuredisclosurequalitythroughtheadoptionofacontentanalysisapproach,:..purposesofdisclosure,,weinvestigatedisclosers'plyorexplain”-,onceaguaranteedremedyforsleeplessness,hasmadeaspectacularentryontopoliticalandregulatoryagendas.(Power1997:57)Inhisanalysisofthedevelopmentoftheroleofaudit,Powerobservesthatinternaleincreasinglyimportantaspartofasystemofregulationwhichreliesonmakinginternalmechanismsvisiblethroughformsofself-',whichformstheapexoftheinternalcontrolanisation,,bothinternalandexternal,canclaimexpertiseininternalcontrol,advancingtheirorganisationalpositioninthecaseofinternalauditors(SpiraandPage2003)(Cunningham2004).Theuseofinternalcontrolasacorporategovernancedevicereflectsasubtlebutsignificantchangeinitsconception,movingfromtheoriginal“supportive”notionthatanisationwhichenableditsgoalstobeachieved,tothemorerecentviewofinternalcontrolasasubstantially“preventive”system,:..anisationalchange—'delegation'-basedapproachestointernalcontrolhasresultedinaconfluenceofinternalcontrolandriskmanagementtothepointthataninfluentialpublication(JonesandSutherland1999)issuedatthesametimeastheTurnbullguidancereferredfrequentlyto“internalcontrolandriskmanagement”“good”,,assummarisedinalecturebyMautz(1980).Hequotesthe1949AICPAdefinition:prisestheplananizationandallofthecoordinatemethodsandmeasuresadoptedwithinabusinesstosafeguarditsassets,ountingdata,promoteoperationalefficiency,'“accountingcontrol”(safeguardingassetsandcheckingreliabilityandountingdata)and“administrativecontrol”(promotionofoperationalefficiencyandencouragementofadherencetoprescribedmanagementpolicies)anddefinedauditors'“accountingcontrol”evenmore.:..tothispoint,“ountingcontrol”.Italsochangedthefocusofinternalcontrol:whereastheconcernsof“accountingcontrol”anisationallevelsandclericalprocedures,(COSO1992)subsequentlyproducedanintegratedframeworkforinternalcontrolin1992,defininginternalcontrolas:Aprocessdesignedtoprovidereasonableassuranceregardingtheachievementofobjectivesinthefollowingcategories:?Effectivenessandefficiencyofoperations.?Reliabilityoffinancialreporting.?Compliancewithapplicablelawsandregulations(COSO1992,)However,theSarbanesOxleylegislationof2002introducedafurtherdefinition:“internalcontroloverfinancialreporting”,internalcontrolfirstenteredthecorporategovernanceagendawhenthemittee,reportingin1992onthefinancialaspectsofcorporategovernance,:..thefirsttime,'srequirementsforreportingoninternalcontrol,tleavoidedbyCadbury,,,theguidanceappearsessful,::作为监管工具的披露传统的企业责任框架依赖于利益相关者的信息披露。从十九世纪中期建立起对投资者、债权人的法律保护以来,披露的形式、内容和可靠性已经成为人们普遍关注的争论的焦点。典型的财务丑闻要求改进披露。我们假设这种披露的形式是通过利益相关者提供的信息实现的,这种信息来源于他们手中持有的公司资源的管理权。财务报告使用者需要依据报告所披露的信息来做与企业的相关的经济决策,这就要求财务报告的规范化发展,这是财务报告概念框架发展的基础同时也形成了不同披露目的观点。最近,信息披露已经成为一个监管工具。例如,英国2006年公司法要求公司作出风险和未来前景有关的披露。这种披露方法作为一种监管工具,最近在欧洲政策的会议讨论中反映出来。2002冬季报告指出:披露要求可以提供一个比实质性管理的更有效的监管手段。这种披露创建了一个轻松的监管环境,并且考虑到较大的灵活性和适应性(第34页)。本文讨论的“欧盟的风险管理和内部控制”声明如下:……假如监管是必要的,那么信息披露是首选的监管工具,因为他将:..2005欧洲会计专家协会,第4页)。由此看出,披露得益于三个相互联系相互重叠的观点:确保代表公司问责制的利益相关者和良好的公司治理;使投资决定能够更好实现和资本市场的平稳运行;作为一种实现监管机构目标的间接的调控形式。美国的证券立法从上世纪30年代就已经开始实行强制披露。尽管披露是公司问责制度的核心,但是英国对不同企业的立法方法已表现出明显的差异。关于安然事件“道德对准则”的争论发生后,对这种差异的认识大大地提高了(Bush,2005)。针对问责制度的这些明显的缺点,所以要求充分地披露信息。英国的公司治理政策在准则的基础上“遵守或者是解释”发展,其过程体现了“软”方针的特征,,虽然准则上还是自愿遵守的,但是实际上却是实行信息的强制披露。支持这种方