文档介绍：债权激励降低了银行系统性风险吗?
黄秀路葛鹏飞
西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心西北大学中国西部经济发展研究中心西北大学经济管理学院
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摘    要:
2008年国际金融危机后, 中国银监会把债权激励作为银行业薪酬制度改革的重要方向。理论上讲, 债权激励存在防范风险、稳定金融的作用;而现实中, 债权激励是否降低了银行系统性风险, 其影响机制如何?文章利用Co Va R方法, 测度了中国上市银行的系统性风险, 构建非观测效应面板模型分析了债权激励影响银行系统性风险的直接与间接效应。研究发现: (1) 债权激励能够显著降低银行系统性风险, 存在直接影响效应。(2) 债权激励对银行系统性风险的间接影响效应有两种渠道:其一, 通过缓解期限错配, 弱化银行间借贷关联, 抑制银行系统性风险;其二, 提高非利息收入(尤其是手续费及佣金收入) 占比, 强化银行的收入稳定性, 达到降低银行系统性风险的目的。而衍生金融工具对银行系统性风险的影响存在不确定性, 原因在于监管部门和银行业对衍生金融工具的使用过于谨慎。文章的结论对于中国银行业薪酬激励方案改革、优化审慎监管方向、防范银行系统性风险具有重要的政策意义。
关键词:
银行系统性风险; 高管债权激励; 期限错配; 非利息收入; 衍生金融工具;
作者简介:黄秀路(1987-) , 女, 湖南桂阳人, 西安交通大学金禾经济研究中心博士研究生;
作者简介:葛鹏飞(1985-) , 男, 河北石家庄人, 西北大学中国西部经济发展研究中心、经济管理学院博士研究生。
基金:教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(16JJD790048)
Do Debt-based Incentives Lower Bank Systemic Risks?
Huang Xiulu Ge Pengfei
Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi'an Jiaotong University; Center for Studies of China Western Economic Development, Northwest University;
Abstract:
The outbreak of the 2008 international financial crisis underlines banking system instability, and the improper pensation incentive plans are generally regarded as a deep cause. Hence, US, UK, EU etc, all issued schemes to reform bank pensation, among which the debt-based incentives, such as pensation and bonus recovery, are the important measure. In February of 2010, China Banking mission (CBRC) also released “Guidelines for pensation Supervision mercial Banks”, clearly mercial banks to enact the alike debt-based incentives. This practice has linked risk costs and risk deduction directly with pensation, and as a result, compensation mechanism can fully play the constraint role in risk literature on effects of debt-based incentives centers around the risk taking at individual banking level, and proves that debt-based incentives are helpful to the achievement of benefit consistency between CEOs and creditors, and the alleviation of benefit conflicts bet