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Introduction
Internal control, property rights, and cost stickiness are all important factors that affect the financial performance of listed companies in China. Internal control is related to the management of financial and operational risks, while property rights determine the incentives for management to make decisions that maximize shareholder value. Cost stickiness reflects the degree to which costs adjust to changes in revenues, and it can also be affected by internal control and property rights. In this paper, we conducted an empirical study to investigate the relationship between internal control, property rights, and cost stickiness in Chinese listed companies.
Background
Internal control is a crucial component of corporate governance, and it is an integral part of the management process. It is a system of processes, policies, and procedures that are designed to provide reasonable assurance that the company's operations are effective, efficient, and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Property rights, on the other hand, refer to the legal rights of individuals or groups to own and use resources, including land, capital, and intellectual property. Property rights affect the incentives of managers to maximize shareholder value, as they determine the level of control and ownership that managers have over the company's assets. Cost stickiness refers to the phenomenon in which costs do not adjust proportionately to changes in revenues, and it can be affected by various factors, including internal control and property rights.
Empirical Study
To examine the relationship between internal control, property rights, and cost stickiness in Chinese listed companies, we collected data from the financial statements of 273 listed companies in China over the period 2013-2018. We used the following variables in our analysis:
- Internal control: measured using an internal control index based on the number of internal control weaknesses identified in the company's financial statements.
- Property rights: measured using the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder and the percentage of shares held by state-owned enterprises.
- Cost stickiness: measured using the coefficient of determination from a linear regression of costs on revenues.
Our regression analysis revealed the following results:
First, we found that internal control has a significant negative effect on cost stickiness. This implies that companies with stronger internal control systems are more likely to adjust costs in response to changes in revenues, which can improve their profitability and financial performance.
Second, we found that property rights have a significant positive effect on cost stickiness. Specifically, companies with a higher percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder or by state-owned enterprises are more likely to exhibit cost stickiness. This may be because these companies have less pressure to maximize shareholder value and are more likely to prioritize other objectives, such as social welfare or political influence.
Thirdly, we found that the relationship between internal control and cost stickiness is moderated by property rights. Specifically, the negative effect of internal control on cost stickiness is weaker for companies with higher levels of state ownership or concentration of ownership by the largest shareholder. This suggests that property rights play an important role in determining the effectiveness of internal control in promoting cost adjustment.
Conclusion
In conclusion, our study provides empirical evidence of the relationship between internal control, property rights, and cost stickiness in Chinese listed companies. We found that internal control has a negative effect on cost stickiness, while property rights have a positive effect on cost stickiness. Moreover, property rights moderate the effect of internal control on cost stickiness, indicating that the effectiveness of internal control in promoting cost adjustment depends on the degree of concentration of ownership and state control. These findings have important implications for policymakers, investors, and managers in China, as they suggest that improvements in corporate governance, including internal control and property rights, can lead to improved financial performance and cost efficiency in listed companies.