文档介绍：1
Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations

Robert O. Keohane
James B. Duke Professor of Political Science
Duke University

Author’s note: The article appears in The Journal of Legal Studies, Volume XXXI (1), Pt. 2, January 2002:
S307-S319.

This volume is an attempt to explore the value of rational-choice analysis for the
study of international law. As the editors suggest, the field of international law has been
quite resistant to rational-choice analysis. It is important to recognize, however, that the
enterprise of which this volume is an example is not new. Political scientists have used
rational-choice analysis for two decades to understand international institutions,
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beginning notably with a special issue of anization in 1982. Some
international legal scholars understood fairly quickly that “international institutions,” in
the language of political science, were largely equivalent to “international law” as they
understood it. Indeed, Anne-Marie Slaughter characterized institutionalist work on
3
international regimes as “reinventing international law in rational-choice language.”
h Abbott was the pioneer among international legal scholars in introducing
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political scientists’ arguments about institutions into the legal literature. More recently,
another special issue of anization – this time an interdisciplinary
venture involving international legal scholars -- has been devoted to the subject of
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legalization.

1 ments are highly indebted to the discussion at the conference on Rational Choice and
International Law, University of Chicago Law School, April 27-29, 2001. I especially want to thank
h Abbott, e Downs, John Ferejohn, Jack Goldsmith, Nannerl O. Keohane, Eric Posner, Imke
Risopp-Nickelson, and Duncan Snidal ments on earlier drafts.
2 anization, volume 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), reprinted in Stephen D. Krasner, ed.,
International Regimes (Ithaca: