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文档介绍:Page iii
A Course in Game Theory
Martin J. Osborne
Ariel Rubinstein
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
Page iv
Copyright © 1994 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic. or mechanical means
(including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the
publisher.
This book was typeset by the authors, who are greatly indebted to Donald Knuth (the creator of TEX), Leslie
Lamport (the creator of LATEX), and Eberhard Mattes (the creator of emTEX) for generously putting superlative
software in the public domain. Camera-ready copy was produced by Type 2000, Mill Valley, California, and the
book was printed and bound by The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group, Binghamton, New York.
Osborne, Martin J.
A course in game theory I Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-15041-7.—ISBN 0-262-65040-1 (pbk.)
1. Game theory. I. Rubinstein, Ariel. II. Title.
HB 1994
'0353-dc20 94-8308
CIP
Fifth printing, 1998
Page v
CONTENTS
Preface xi
1 1
Introduction
Game Theory 1
Games and Solutions 2
Game Theory and the Theory petitive Equilibrium 3
Rational Behavior 4
The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations 5
Bounded Rationality 6
Terminology and Notation 6
Notes 8
I 9
Strategic Games
2 11
Nash Equilibrium
Strategic Games 11
Nash Equilibrium 14
Examples 15
Existence of a Nash Equilibrium 19
petitive Games 21
Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect Information 24
Notes 29
Page vi
3 31
Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 31
Interpretations of Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium 37
Correlated Equilibrium 44
Evolutionary Equilibrium 48
Notes 51
4 53
Rat