文档介绍：The Design of Transnational
Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries∗
Jean-Jacques Laffont†
and
David Martimort‡
Revised Version: October 13, 2003
Abstract
We analyze the design of incentive mechanisms for the provision of transnational
public goods under asymmetric information. Transnational public goods are infras-
tructures that no single country can afford to built for itself. We show that the
external constraints imposed by this mechanism may affect consumption, pricing
and the true redistributive concerns of local governments. We quantify the corre-
sponding distortions. We also discuss the impact of the preferences for redistribution
of the international agency in charge of designing the mechanism and the role of its
ability to enforce that mechanism.
Keywords: Transnational Public Goods, Incentive Mechanisms.
JEL Codes: H41, D82.
∗We thank Paulina Beato for suggesting this research and Pierre Dubois for very ments on
an earlier version. Two referees made ments which have much improved the paper. The
usual disclaimer applies.
†Universit de Toulouse, (IDEI, GREMAQ, ARQADE) and University of South California at Los
Angeles.
‡Universit de Toulouse (IDEI, GREMAQ) and Institut Universitaire de France.
1
1 Introduction
It is well recognized by now, both among practitioners and scholars, that proper infras-
tructures are key to economic development. Several empirical studies illustrate the impact
of infrastructures on economic A 1 % increase in the stock of infrastructures
can increase GDP by up to .20 %. Despite this importance, some countries have faced
a significant shortage in accessing to crucial infrastructures. For instance, the stock and
quality levels of infrastructures in Latin America and Caribbean countries has lost signifi-
cant ground relative to East Asia and OECD countries. To illustrate that point, Calderon
and Serven (2002) show that, from 1980 to 1997, the Latin America infrastructure