文档介绍：An Economic Analysis of Campaign Finance
Andrea Prat Address: STICERD, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Email: a.******@. Homepage: . I am grateful to Ellynne Dec and Patrick Francois for useful discussions.
Tilburg University and London School of Economics
28 October 1999
Summary
Campaign finance is an important, and much debated, phenomenon in democracies throughout the world. This article discusses a possible economic model of campaign finance, which could be used for policy evaluation. At the core of the model lies an asymmetry of information between lobbies and voters. Lobbies know more than voters about the quality of candidates. Campaign contributions constitute an indirect way to reveal lobbies’ information to voters. However, this informational es at the cost of candidates deviating from the median voter’s preferred policy in order to attract higher contributions.
Introduction
Electoral campaigns can be very expensive. In several countries including the US, candidates buy TV time to broadcast advertising. What many voters are fortable with is that often the money to pay for es from lobbies whose goal is to influence policy-making. As a result, several countries have imposed or are considering various forms of campaign finance regulations. Economics may be useful in modeling this phenomenon and trying