文档介绍：描述心理学对先验现象学
――兼谈狄尔泰和胡塞尔在哲学思想上的联姻与争论
张庆熊
(复旦大学哲学系,上海200433)
作者简介:张庆熊(1950-),男,上海市人,瑞士弗莱堡大学哲学博士,复旦大学哲学系教授,博士生导师
摘要:狄尔泰(Wilhelm Dilthey,1833-1911)以描述心理学而不是以先验现象学作为他的认识论的基础,这是他与胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl,1859-1938)在哲学思想上的戏剧性的联姻与激烈争论的关键所在。胡塞尔认为狄尔泰的立场势必导致相对主义和怀疑论,而狄尔泰从来不接受这一评语。本文试图说明为什么狄尔泰反对胡塞尔的先验唯心主义,坚持自己的“实在论的或批评地客观导向的”哲学研究的理由。
关键词:狄尔泰,胡塞尔,描述心理学,先验现象学
Descriptive Psychology versus Transcendental Phenomenology—on the Philosophical Alliance and Controversy between W. Dilthey and E. Husserl
Abstract: The crux that caused a dramatic alliance and a heavy controversy in philosophical thinking between W. Dilthey (1833-1911) and E. Husserl (1859-1938) lies in that Dilthey took the descriptive psychology instead of the transcendental phenomenology as the groundwork for his epistemology. According to Husserl Dilthey’s standpoint will result in relativism and skepticism. Dilthey, however, has never admitted this remark. In this article I try to clarify the reason why Dilthey insisted his “realistic or critically objective oriented” approach in his philosophical investigation versus Husserl’s transcendental idealism.
Key Words: Dilthey, Husserl, descriptive psychology, transcendental phenomenology
狄尔泰(Wilhelm Dilthey,1833-1911)以描述心理学而不是以先验现象学作为他的认识论的基础,这是他与胡塞尔(Edmund Husserl,1859-1938)在哲学思想上的联姻与争论的关键所在。在狄尔泰看来,现象学如果限制在描述心理学的范围,那么现象学是可以接受的,并且他乐意承认和采纳胡塞尔在描述心理现象和心理结构方面的一系列研究成果,但是现象学一旦走上先验唯心主义的