文档介绍：专稿
荨
金融危机中国际货币政策协调的
有效性分析
吴军张弼
(对外经济贸易大学金融学院,北京 100029)
本文以年以来全球金融危机对新兴市场国家的传导及国际货币政策协调为例运用博弈论的方法
摘要: 2007 ,
从福利角度比较分析了非合作博弈与合作博弈两种结局得出协调要优于不协调的结论分析中发现对于新兴市
, 。,
场国家而言其经济实力明显弱于美国危机冲击和货币政策传导效应的非对称性决定其很可能陷入由美国主导
, , ,
的斯坦克尔伯格博弈的协调模式其福利可能不一定优于纳什均衡时的状况因此新兴市场经济国家应积极参与
, 。,
国际货币政策协调但是要避免采取处于尾随地位的斯坦克尔伯格博弈的协调方式
, 。
国际金融危机国际货币政策协调斯坦克尔伯格博弈
关键词: ; ;
Abstract: This paper studies the transmission of the global financial crisis from USA to the emerging markets since 2007
and international ary policy coordination, using game theory to take parative analysis of the welfare of
non-cooperative solution and cooperative solution, which concluded that the coordination is better than non-coordination. The
analysis found that the coordination might e a Stackelberg leadership model due to the relative weaker power of the
emerging pared to the US economy, which depends on the asymmetric of the crisis shock and effects of
ary policy transmission. As followers, the equilibrium might not dominate the Nash equilibrium for the emerging
countries. Therefore, the emerging economies should actively participate in the coordination but try to avoid ing a
follower in a Stackelberg leadership model.
Key Words: international financial crisis, international ary policy coordination, stackelberg game
中图分类号: F830 文献标识码: A 文章编号: 1674-2265 (2010) 05-0003-06
每个国家在运用货币政策实现其宏观经济目标