文档介绍：Internalism and Epistemology
Internalism and Epistemology is a powerful articulation and defense of a clas-
sical answer to an enduring question: What is the nature of rational belief?
In opposition to prevailing philosophical fashion, the book argues that
epistemic externalism leads, not just to skepticism, but to epistemic
nihilism – the denial of the very possibility of justification. And it defends a
subtle and sophisticated internalism against criticisms that have widely but
mistakenly been thought to be decisive.
Beginning with an internalist response to the Gettier problem, the authors
deal with the problem of the connection to truth, stressing the distinction
between ess and rationality as critical to its resolution. They develop a
metaregress argument against externalism that has devastating consequences
for any view according to which epistemic principles are contingent. The
same argument does not, they argue, affect the version of internalism they
espouse, since its epistemic principles are analytic and knowable a priori.
The final chapter addresses the problem of induction and shows that its
solution turns critically on the distinction between ess and rationality –
the very distinction that lies at the heart of the dispute between internalists
and externalists.
Provocative, probing, and deliberately unfashionable, Internalism and
Epistemology is a ringing defense of internalism that will interest specialists
and students alike. It is essential reading for anyone who suspects that rumors
of the death of traditional epistemology have been greatly exaggerated.
Timothy McGrew is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Philo-
sophy at Western Michigan University and the author of The Foundations of
Knowledge (1995). His articles have appeared in numerous journals including
Analysis, Mind, The Monist, and British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Lydia McGrew lives in southwestern Michigan where she educates her
three child