文档介绍：Popper, K. R. (Professor of Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics,
University of London), INDETERMINISM IN QUANTUM PHYSICS AND IN CLASSICAL PHYSICS, Part 11,
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1:3 (1950:Nov.)
Extracted from PCI Fzd1 Text, published by ProQuest Information and pany.
The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science
VOLUMEI NOVEMBER,1950 No. 3
INDETERMINISM IN QUANTUM PHYSICS AND IN
CLASSICAL PHYSICS
PART 11*
We now proceed to the discussion of the theorem which asserts
that puting part of a predictor must be incapable of producing
an accurate answer to every question concerning its own future physical
states, whatever the amount of information it has received about its
own past or present states. (As a kind of explanation of this fact,
it will be shown that however full this infornlation may be it will
always be plete in an important way.) Throughout this
section, we shall confine our investigation to the calculator part%f the
predictor ; and it does not signify whether we assume that the cal-
culator part receives its information from its owl measuring parts
or from sonle other (outside) source.
In view of the r6le played by this theorem in our whole argu-
mentation, I shall discuss it at some length. My discussion will
consider three arguments, in some respects si~nilarand not unconnected,
but in other respects independent. The three arguments may be
briefly described, for easier reference, (I) as a variant of the so-called
' paradox of Tristrclm Shardy ' ; (11) as a physical application of so-called
' Goedeliat~sentertces' ; and (111) as a utilisation of what I usually call
the ' Oediprs eJect '.I
* Part I appcarcd in volume I, no. 2 of thisJounra!.
' Only the last of these three was discussed in my original paper. See note I
on p. 117, above (volumc I, no. 2 bf this jotmrd).
12 *" 173
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