文档介绍：The Concept of Mind
First published in 1949, Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind is one of the classics
of twentieth-century philosophy. Described by Ryle as a ‘sustained piece of
analytical hatchet-work’ on Cartesian dualism, The Concept of Mind is a radical
and controversial attempt to jettison once and for all what Ryle called ‘the
ghost in the machine’: Descartes’ argument that mind and body are two separ-
ate entities.
As well as rejecting dualism about the mind, Ryle goes much further, arguing
that more recent materialist or functionalist theories of mind do not solve the
Cartesian puzzle either and even accept some of its fundamental, mistaken,
propositions. It is because of these mistaken propositions that associated
problems, such as mental causation and ‘other minds’, arise in the first place.
Ryle builds his case via an erudite and beautifully written account of the
will, emotion, self-knowledge, sensation and observation, imagination and the
intellect. Some of the problems he tackles, such as the distinction between
‘knowing how and knowing that’, challenged some of the bedrock assumptions
of philosophy and continue to exert important influence on contemporary
philosophy.
A classic work of philosophy, The Concept of Mind is essential reading for
anyone interested in the nature of the mind and human behaviour. This sixtieth
anniversary edition includes a mentary by Julia Tanney.
Together with the reissue of both volumes of Ryle’s Collected Papers, it provides
essential reading for new readers interested not only in the history of analytic
philosophy but in its power to challenge major currents in philosophy of mind
and language today.
Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) was a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church College
Oxford and in 1945 was elected to the Waynflete Chair of Metaphysical
Philosophy; a position he held until his retirement in 1968. He was Editor of the
journal Mind for almost twenty-five years.
Julia Tanney is Senior Le