文档介绍：沈阳理工大学
硕士学位论文
民营上市公司终极控制权对资本结构影响的实证研究
姓名:孟俊红
申请学位级别:硕士
专业:会计专业
指导教师:范抒
2011-03
沈阳理工大学硕士学位论文

摘要

自从 La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes 和 Shleifer(1999)首先采用追溯至上市
公司终极控制人的方法来分析控制性股东与小股东之间的代理问题以来,大量的
研究表明 Bebchuk ,(2000);Claessens ,(2002),终极控制权作为民营
上市公司内部治理机制的基本特征,深刻地影响着公司的财务决策行为。当然资
本结构作为公司的重要财务决策必然也会受到影响。
本文基于终极控制人框架,以资本结构为对象研究终极控制权对民营上市公
司的影响。终极控制人会通过建立金字塔式的控股结构或者交叉持股的方式取得
对民营上市公司的控制权,而此时的显著特征是存在着终极控制权和现金流量权
之间的偏离,终极控制人就是利用这个来对公司进行控制并对中小股东的利益进
行侵占。本文以 2007 年— 2009 年我国沪深证券交易所 1684 家民营上市公司为样
本,构建了两个现金流量权与控制权的偏离度的度量指标,通过实证方法找出目
前我国民营上市公司终极控制人的状况,并且验证了终极控制权与资本结构选择
之间的关系,得出了很有用的结论。

关键字:民营上市公司,终极控制权,现金流量权,资本结构
沈阳理工大学硕士学位论文

Abstract

La Porta,Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer had analyzed the agency problem
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders through tracing backto
ultimate controllers in that,many studies showed that ultimate controllers’
control is a basic character of the internal mechanism of corporate governance. It not
only decided the distribution pattern panies’ residual claim right and residual
control right,but also panies’ financial decision. panies’ capital
structure would be affected inevitably.
Based on the structure of ultimate controllers,this paper studied the influence of
ultimate control right panies,taking capital structure as object. In panies
with ultimate controllers,ultimate controllers would panies through
establishing pyramid ownership structure and cross-shareholding system. It resulted
that control right deviated from cash flow right. Then ultimate controllers could control
the panies and infringe minor shareholders’ benefits. Using 1684 sample
panies in shanghai stock exchange in 2007,this paper established the
indicator of deviation degree between cash flow right and ultimate control right,found
the ultimate controllers’situation in panies,verified the relationship between
ultimate control right and capital structure choice.
T