文档介绍：
基于动态博弈分析的企业反倾销应诉“成本
-收益”决策模型研究#
刘爱东,曾辉祥*
5
10
(中南大学商学院,长沙 410083)
摘要:反倾销涉案企业参与应诉与否或参与程度的决策,取决于应诉收益与应诉成本的权衡。
基于动态博弈理论,建立不完备信息下出口企业应诉决策的动态博弈模型,量化应诉成本和
应诉收益,构建了基于“成本-收益”理论的出口企业反倾销应诉决策模型,以出口产品价
格和数量为标准,通过数理推导得出涉案出口企业应诉决策的 5 个临界点。可见,实现反倾
销应诉决策的量化才是中国企业克服应诉信心不足、应诉败阵和构筑反倾销高效应诉机制的
本原。
关键词:会计学;动态博弈模型;反倾销应诉决策;“成本-收益”理论;应诉决策模型
中图分类号:
15
Enterprise anti-dumping litigation-responding
"cost-benefit" decision-making model research based on
dynamic game analysis
20
25
30
35
40
LIU Aidong, ZENG Huixiang
(Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083)
Abstract: Anti-dumping enterprises involved make the decision of litigation or not or the degree
of participation, depends on the trade-offs litigation earnings and litigation costs. Based on the
dynamic game theory, establish export enterprises responding to decision under plete
information dynamic game model, consider the cost of quantitative investigations and responding
gains, build up the export enterprises anti-dumping litigation-responding decision model based on
the "cost-benefit" theory, on the basis of export product price and quantity, through mathematical
derivation getting the involved export enterprises five responses to the decision point. Visible,
realizing the quantitative anti-dumping litigation-responding decision-making are the way of
Chinese enterprises to e the respondent confidence insufficiency, failure responses and
build up the anti-dumping efficient litigation mechanism principle.
Key words: Accounting;Dynamic game model; The anti-dumping litigation-responding decisions;
"Cost-benefit" theory; Responses to decision-making model
0 引言
近年来,欧美等西方发达国家为了化解金融危机对其经济造成的重挫和不断上升的贸易
逆差,频繁对中国展开“两反一保”(即反倾销、反补贴和保障措施)指控和调查,过度运用反
倾销等措施实施贸易保护的行为,这不仅预示着国际贸易保护主义新动向的愈演愈烈趋势,
同时也反映了其背后所蕴含的深层次背景和当下中国企业所面临的激烈国际竞争。
WTO 最新数据显示a,1995 年至 2012 年 6 月 30 日,中国遭受的反倾销调查和反倾销措
施数量分别为 884 起和 643 起,依次占世界总量(全球反倾销立案 4125 起,最终采取反倾
基金项目:2012 年国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272068);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(11YJA6