文档介绍：1 市场约束、政府干预与商业银行风险承担曹廷求张光利( 山东大学银行治理研究中心,山东济南, 250100 ) 本文为教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(07JJD630002) 、教育部“新世纪优秀人才支持计划( NCET-10-0517 )”、山东大学自主创新基金和山东大学“ 985 ”项目“金融理论与政策研究”的部分研究成果。作者简介:曹廷求(1968 , 7—) ,安徽安庆人,博士,教授, 博士生导师,山东大学银行治理研究中心主任,山东大学经济学院金融系主任;张光利(198 7, 6—),山东潍坊人,山东大学银行治理研究中心硕士研究生。联系方式: 通信地址:济南市山大南路 27号山东大学经济学院曹廷求收邮政编码: 250100 电子信箱: tqcao@ 电话: ********** ; 0531 - 88361686 2 市场约束、政府干预与商业银行风险承担摘要: 本文将政府干预行为的收益视为隐性存款保险制度的价格, 利用 2000-2009 年中国主要城市商业银行的财务数据, 实证分析了市场约束、政府干预与银行风险承担的关系。我们从价格机制和数量机制的角度分析市场约束的有效性, 结果发现市场机制没有有效地约束银行风险, 相反政府干预机制显著地增加了银行的风险, 在一定程度上政府干预机制替代了市场约束机制的作用。通过进一步分析,我们发现:在制度环境差、政府干预强的地区, 市场约束机制完全失效, 而在制度环境好、政府干预相对较弱的地区, 市场的价格约束机制显著地降低了银行的风险; 风险不同的银行所受的政府干预与市场约束效应不同。为维持银行体系的稳定,在完善银行内部风险控制机制的同时,要不断完善外部公共治理环境。关键词: 银行风险;市场约束;政府干预 Market Discipline, Government Intervention mercial Bank Risk Abstract: This paper regards the benefits from the government intervention behavior s as the price of the implicit deposit insurance institution. We make an empirical analysis about the relationship among the market discipline, government intervention and the bank risk, using financial data of the main Chinese city banks from 2000 to2009. We analyze the validity of the market discipline from the price mechanism and quantity mechanism perspective s and find that market mechanism has not disciplined bank risk effectively. However, the government intervention mechanism has significantly increase d the bank risk and to some extent the government intervention mechanism has replaced the market mechanism to affect the bank risk. Through further study, we find that the market discipline has no effect in the regions with bad institutional environment and strong government intervention. However, market discipline has significantly decrease d the bank risk in the region s with good institutional environment and weak government intervention. What ’s more, the effects of government intervention and market discipline suffered by banks with different risk levels are different. In order to maint