文档介绍：摘要中国上市公司内部监督机制,起初采用的是“二元制”模式下的监事会制。但是,就制度实践的情况来看,上市公司的监事会并没有发挥其应有的监督作用, 被虚化、被架空,,中国证监会颁布《关于在上市公司建立独立董事制度的指导意见》,强制要求上市公司引入独立董事制度, 作为内部监督机制一种改良和补充,新((公司法》对这一制度进行确认。但是,移植一种的新的监督机制,并不意味着解决另外一种监督机制的有效性问题。有学者也提出质疑,独立董事与我国现行公司治理结中的监事会的职能相互重叠,容易产生“搭便车”的心理,两个机构之间的扯皮、推诿,很可能将仅有的一些监督绩效降低为零。本文从中外上市公司内部监督机构的相互比较出发,阐述具有中国特色的独立董事和监事会并存的公司内部监督机制,.笔者通过博弈和实证分析认为,作为过渡经济的产物,两者肩负相似的使命和责任,其存在具有一定的合理性,虽然两者在性质和职能上存在一定的重叠,但是只要完善相关制度,独立董事和监事会也能产生良好的制度合力,提高公司内部监督效率。关键词:独立董事;监事会;兼容性 Abstract Internaloversight mechanism of panies ofchina,initially usedthe “dualsystem”mode,the board ofsupervisors system,that isparallel tothe establishment ofthesupervisory board andboardofdirectors to pany。S financialposition,supervising themanagement boardofdirectors andmanagers ofthe business ,for thepractice situationofthesystem, thesupervisory board of panies did not play itsproper oversight role, grammaticalization,sidelined,controlled by thesupervisor,or even becalled“deaf .”In ordertomeetthe needs panies listed overseas,but also toprevent afinancial crisisfromthecorporate 2001,the CSRC issuedthe”theguidance oftheindependent panies toestablish system”,mandatory panies invadedtheindependent directorsystem, As allintemaloversight mechanism,and thenew”Law”ofthe system confn'med. However,the transplantation of anew monitoring mechanism,it’S notmeaning solving theproblem ofeffectiveness ofthemechanism,Some scholars have also questioned theindependent directors and corporate govemance functions oftheboard ofsupervisors inthe end overlap Caneasily leadto”free rider”mentality, buck-passing between thetwo bodies,buck,itmay only reduce thenumber of monitoringperformance zero. Thisarticle startwith parison between theChinese andforeign panies,described independent directorsandthesupervisory board CO—existence of internaloversight theproduct of thetransitioneconomies,both have thesimilar missionandresponsibility toshoulder,their existen