文档介绍：: Problems of Philosophy
Prof. Sally Haslanger
October 29, 2001
A Different Sort of Personal Identity: "Ethical" Identity
I. Personal Identity: "Ethical" v. "Metaphysical" questions
The previous lectures and readings on personal identity were primarily concerned with the metaphysics of personal
identity.
Question of diachronic identity/unity: Confronted with an individual X at one time and Y at another, what would
make it the case that X and Y are (or are parts of) the same person?
We've seen that the answer to this question may well depend on what sort of thing you think persons are: are persons
bodies? Streams of consciousness? Souls? So our inquiry can potentially tell us something not only about whether and
under what conditions you or I will survive to the next moment, but also about what it is to be a person at all.
But there is a different and more specific sense in which we might be concerned with the "identity" of a person, ., we
might want to know what makes the person X (or stages X+Y) Tracy Roberts rather than Michaela Johnson or even Darren
Williams.
Question of precise individuation: What makes X (or X+Y) the very person he or she is?
We are asking: what is it that distinguishes persons from each other, that makes me me and you you, and me not you. Is
there some unique mark or feature that I and only I have, that no