文档介绍：Designing for Peace: Regional
Integration Arrangements,
Institutional Variation, and
Militarized Interstate Disputes
Yoram Z+ Haftel
Abstract Does institutional variation have implications for questions of conflict
and peace? Theory indicates that it does, but extant studies that address this ques-
tion treat such institutions as homogenous+ Building on recent theoretical advances,
I argue that cooperation on a wide array of economic issues and regular meetings
of high-level officials provide member-states with valuable information regarding
the interests and resolve of their counterparts+ This, in turn, reduces uncertainty and
improves the prospects of a peaceful resolution of interstate disputes+ To test the
effect of these two institutional features on the level of militarized interstate dis-
putes ~MIDs!, I present an original data set that measures variation in institutional
design and implementation across a large number of regional integration arrange-
ments ~RIAs! in the 1980s and 1990s+ Employing multivariate regression tech-
niques and the regional unit of analysis, I find that a wider scope of economic activity
and regular meetings among high-level officials mitigate violent conflict+ These results
remain intact after controlling for alternative explanations and addressing concerns
of endogeneity+
Regional conflict and war are persistent problems of international politics+ These
problems have greatly intensified since the end of the Cold War+ The wars that
revolved around the Democratic Republic of Congo and the clashes between India
and Pakistan are some prominent examples of this trend+ At the same time, eco-
nomic regionalism is proliferating, with regional integration arrangements ~RIAs!
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ~NAFTA! and mon
Market of the South ~MERCOSUR!; and deepening, as many existing RIAs, such
as the European Union ~EU! and the munity of West African States
Earlier drafts of this pape