文档介绍：The Benefit of the Doubt: Testing an
Informational Theory of the Rally Effect
Michael Colaresi
Abstract In this article I investigate the apparent tension between liberal theo-
ries that highlight the foreign policy benefits of domestic accountability and the obser-
vation that the public tends to reflexively support a leader during an international
crisis+ Previous theories of the process by which the public rallies around their leader
tend to highlight the emotional and automatic nature of citizens’ responses to threats+
Using a simple signaling model, I show that the political and operational circum-
stances that increase the probability of post hoc verification and punishment for pri-
vately motivated policy enhance the credibility of a leader’s choices and transmit
information on the benefits of action to the public+ I derive several observable hypoth-
eses from the informational model, linking the costliness of the signal, the presences
of divided government, election years, active term limits, political insecurity, changes
in freedom of information laws, and trust in government to the size of the rally in the
United States+ A battery of empirical tests offer strong support for the informational
model and suggest that a public rally is a rational response to numerous international
crisis circumstances+ Observing a rally need not imply an emotional or irrational public+
One of the central debates in international relations dissects what role the public
plays in foreign policy and world politics+ Many liberal theories of international
politics assume both that the public actively constrains foreign policy in democ-
racies and that these public constraints have positive policy repercussions+1 Theo-
retical models building on this public-as-constraint assumption suggest that where
leaders face institutional checks and balances from effective legislatures and reg-
ular elections, foreign policy action is likely to be more effective