文档介绍：Chapter 24
POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE*
TORSTEN PERSSON
Institutefor InternationalEconomic Studies, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
GUIDO TABELLINI
IGIER, oni University, Milano, Italy
Contents
Abstract 1551
Keywords 1551
1. General introduction 1552
Part I. General redistributive politics 1556
2. Rich vs. poor 1558
. A simple model of redistribution 1558
. Equilibrium redistribution 1560
. Implications and evidence 1561
. Notes on the literature 1563
3. Young vs. old 1564
. A simple model of pensions 1565
. Voters' preferences 1566
. Equilibrium pensions 1567
. Evidence and extensions 1569
. Notes on the literature 1573
4. Employed vs. unemployed 1574
. A simple model of unemployment insurance 1574
. Voters' preferences 1575
. Equilibrium unemployment insurance 1577
. Evidence and extensions 1578
. Equilibrium labor-market regulations 1579
. Extensions 1581
* We thank a number of colleagues especially Alan Auerbach, David Baron, Tim Besley, Francesco
Daveri, Avinash Dixit, and Gerard Roland - and . students - especially Gisela Waisman - for
comments on earlier drafts. Christina Lbnnblad and Alessandra Startari provided editorial assistance.
The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation, the mission (a TMR-Grant), and oni
University supported the underlying research.
Handbook of Public Economics, Volume 3, Edited by . Auerbach and M. Feldstein
© 2002 Elsevier Science B. V All rights reserved
1550 T: Persson and G. Tabellini
. Notes on the literature 1583
5. Capital vs. labor 1583
. A simple model of capital and labor taxation 1585
. petition between Downsian candidates 1586
. Ex-ante elections 1586
. Ex-post elections 1587
. Equilibrium taxation with citizen candidates 1588
. Preferences over candidates 1589
. Endogenous entry of candidates 1590
. Single-candidate equilibria 159