文档介绍：本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文:
Performance Evaluation, Economic Value Added and Managerial Behaviour
1. Introduction
For the past two decades many countries started transforming their economies from traditional protected ones to those of more liberalized, globalised and market driven. This period has also seen the economies ing more knowledge oriented and Human Resources started assuming more prominence in the growth of the economies and businesses. But this has also posed a greater challenge panies to acquire and retain talented workforce (especially at the strategic & managerial levels). The knowledge economy also started witnessing the rapid rise of the agency problem- conflict of interest between managers and owners. The managers – in their role as the agents– are expected to act in the best interests of the shareholders (principals). Managers will act in shareholders’ interests only if they have right incentives. So it is very essential to align the interests of the managers and shareholders or at least reduce the difference between them.
So we need a measure that on one hand rightly measures the managerial performance so that he managers – with talent and greater mobility- can be pensated (and hence retained) and on the other aligns the interests of the managers and shareholders.
For some time now Stock Price was thought to be an ideal measure achieving the above objectives. However stock price has many limitations.
We shall discuss the pitfalls of stock price as a performance measure before evaluating some of the traditional performance measures and then introduce Economic Value Added as the right measure of managerial performance
2. Traditional Measures of Managerial Performance
Shareholders want the maximization of stock price (firm value). So can we measure the performance of a manager directly as reflected by the stock price-Reward managers when stock price goes up and punish them if stock prices behave otherwise? This approach has a major limitation.