文档介绍：本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文:
Managerial Performance
One of the major problems the panies face is the conflict of interest between managers and owners -generally known as ‘the agency problem’. It is very essential to align the interests of the mangers and shareholders or at least reduce the difference in interests. In this regard Economic Value Added has been seen as better alternative to the traditional performance measures-Profits, EPS, ROCE and ROE etc. While essful EVA stories in the west are quite encouraging, empirical research is not sufficient to establish the claim of EVA as a better measure. However there is also not much research to prove it otherwise. In case of India either way research is very inadequate. Although not a panacea, EVA pensation plans will drive managers employ a firm’s assets more productively and EVA should help reduce the difference in the interests of the managers and shareholders, if not perfectly align them.
Shareholders want the maximization of stock price (firm value). So can we measure the performance of a manager directly as reflected by the stock price-Reward managers when stock price goes up and punish them if stock prices behave otherwise? This approach has a major limitation. ‘Stock price is driven by so many factors that escape from the control of managers, making it an inefficient measure of the true influence of the mangers on firm’s value. ‘Changes in stock price - in the short run at least – are not always accurate gauze of management performance due to the presence of randomness and noise’(Kang et al, 2002). Tying top pensation to stock prices raises another difficult issue. The market value of pany’s shares reflects investors’ expectations. The stockholder return depends on how well pany performs relative to expectations’. Suppose pany announces the appointment of an outstanding new manager. The stock price leaps up in anticipation of improved performance. Henceforth, even if the new manager delivers exactly the good perfo