文档介绍：本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文:
The Chinese government's new approach to ownership and financial control of strategic state-owned enterprises
Despite three decades of economic reforms in the People's Republic of China (PRC), restructuring of large state-owned enterprise groups has proceeded at a slow pace in recent years. While a variety of different measures and reform models have been tried since the 1980s, these have mostly been half-hearted or essful. The founding of the State Assets Supervision and mission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003 marks a new phase in efforts to deal with the outstanding challenges and unresolved problems of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The founding of SASAC launched a process of redefining the relationship between central government and the so-called 'central enterprises' – the key SOEs that have been selected by the government to form the basis from which China's future top panies will be created. Central enterprises account for the bulk of SOE profits and around a quarter of SOE corporate investment.
The Chinese government'mitment to the market versus the state has fluctuated over the course of the reform period. In the planned economy, state-owned enterprises were an integral part of the state budgeting system, with all their financing needs being covered by the state, and with profits and losses directly included in the state budget. In the late 1970s, more than half the budget revenues came from state-owned enterprises. The low incentives provided to SOE managers in this system led the government to experiment with various models of profit retention, such as the 'contract management responsibility system', through which managers could retain a part of the profits after meeting government-set targets. Following a tax reform in 1994, wholly-owned SOEs were exempted from paying dividends to the government. Between then and now, SOEs have retained almost all their post-tax profits.
During the process of setting up SASAC, the