文档介绍：本科毕业论文(设计)
外文翻译
原文:
Revisiting Managerial Perspectives on Dividend Policy
We survey managers of Nasdaq firms that consistently pay cash dividends to determine their views about dividend policy,the relationship between dividend policy and value,and mon explanations for paying evidence shows that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend continuity and widely agree that changes in dividends affect firm give the strongest support to a signaling explanation for paying dividends,weak to little support to the tax-preference and agency cost explanations,and no support to the bird-in-the-hand study provides new evidence about how managers view dividend life cycles and residual dividend policy.
One of the more puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide pelling and widely accepted argument for dividend irrelevance in a world with perfect capital markets. Many years later, Miller (1986) recognized that the observed preference for cash dividends is one of the “soft spots in the current body of theory.” So why do corporations pay dividends, and why do investors care? Black (1976) once described this issue as a dividend “puzzle” with “pieces that just don’t seem to fit.”
To help explain this puzzle, financial economists developed various theories—signaling, taxpreference, agency costs, and bird-in-the-hand explanations. The profusion of theories led Ang (1987, p. 55) to observe, “Thus, we have moved from a position of not enough good reasons to explain why dividends are paid to one of too many.” Advocates of behavioral finance, such as Shefrin and Statman (1984), introduced concepts such as prospect theory and mental accounting to explain why investors like dividends. Statman (1997) contends that solving the dividend puzzle is
impossible while ignoring the patterns of normal investor behavior. Today, corporate managers areleft with a vast and often conflicting bod