文档介绍：June 10, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 15 1 Dynamic Games of Complete Information Dynamic Games plete and Perfect Information June 10, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 15 2 Outline of dynamic games plete information ? Dynamic games plete information ? Extensive-form representation ? Dynamic games plete and perfect information ? Game tree ? Subgame -perfect Nash equilibrium ? Backward induction ? Applications ? Dynamic games plete and imperfect information ? More applications ? Repeated games June 10, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 15 3 Today ’ s Agenda ? Review of previous class ? Subgame -perfect Nash equilibrium ? Backward induction ? Stackelberg ’s model of duopoly ( of Gibbons, of Osborne) ? Sequential-move Bertrand model of duopoly (differentiated products) June 10, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 15 4 Dynamic games plete and perfect information ? Perfect information ? All previous moves are observed before the next move is chosen. ? A player knows Who has moved What before she makes a decision June 10, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 15 5 Strategy and payoff ? A strategy for a player is plete plan of actions. ? It specifies a feasible action for the player in every contingency in which the player might be called on to act. ? It specifies what the player does at each of her nodes Player 1 Player 2 HT -1 , 11 , -1 HT Player 2 HT1 , -1 -1 , 1 a strategy for player 1: H a strategy for player 2: H if player 1 plays H , T if player 1 plays T (written as HT ) Player 1 ’ s payoff is -1 and player 2 ’ s payoff is 1 if player 1 plays H and player 2 plays HT June 10, 2003 73-347 Game Theory--Lecture 15 6 Nash equilibrium in a dynamic game ? We can also use normal-form to represent a dynamic game ? The set of Nash equilibria in a dynamic game plete information is the set of Nash equilibria of its normal-form ? How to find the Nash equilibria in a dynamic game plete information ? Construct the normal-form of