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ActaOeconomica72(2022)2,231–247
DOI:.00013
Evolvingtrustinbusinessrelationships
–Abehaviouralexperiment
1p2
ANDREAGELEIandIMREDOBOS
1InstituteofBusinessEconomics,CorvinusUniversityofBudapest,Fővámtér8,Budapest,H-1093,
Hungary
2FacultyofEconomicandSocialSciences,BudapestUniversityofTechnologyandEconomics,Hungary
Received:November4,2019•Revisedmanuscriptreceived:October29,2021•Accepted:November3,2021
©2022TheAuthor(s)
ABSTRACT
Usingsituation-specificanddyadicdata,weanalysehowtrustininter-organisationalrelationshipsevolve
,wedefinefourtrust-relatedconcepts,whichincludeboth
thebehaviouralconsistencyofthetrusteeaffectsthelevelofhis/hertrustworthinessasperceivedbythe
,thepaperspecifiesafiniteDynamicTrustGamethat,inauniqueway,
modelslonger-
thesimpleRepeatedGamesmodellingdiscreteexchangeepisodes,thisgamecorrespondstothere-
quirementsoftheinteractionapproachoftherelationshipmanagement,sincetheiterationsofthegameare
interrelatedandembeddedinpreviousones.
TimelydevelopmentofthebehaviouralvariablesinthegamereflectsaninverseU-shapewithan
increasingwillingnesstocooperateuntilround8,withamaximumcooperationlevelof80%onaverage.
,weneedadditionalexperimental
dataoninconsistentbehaviourstogetaclearunderstandingofthiseffect.
KEYWORDS
finitedynamisedtrustgame,time,behaviouralconsistency,businessrelationship
JELCLASSIFICATIONINDICES
C79,D90,L29,M20
-mail:andrea.******@uni-
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232ActaOeconomica72(2022)2,231–247
Thefocalresearchquestionofthispaperishowtrustininter-organisationalrelationshipsde-
,we
testedthehypothesisthatthebehaviouralconsistencyofthetrusteeaffectsthelevelofhis/her
trustworthinessasperceivedbythetrustorandconceptualisedasanassetoftherelationship.
Thereisalong-standingandextremelyrichbodyofliteratureontrust,whichincludes
severalapproachesgeneratingsubstantialknowledge,andleadingtodifferentunderstandings
(Rose-Ackerman2018).ThispaperbuildsontheconceptualisationofExperimentalGame
Theory().However,wediscussedandintegratedintoouranalysisother–partly
overlapping–conceptualisations,developedbyStrategicManagement(.,Barney–Hansen
1994),SocialExchangeTheory(.,Blau1964),RelationshipMarketing(.,Morgan–Hunt
1994),andTransactionCostEconomics(.,Williamson1979).
Severalresearchershaveemphasisedthattrustisoneofthemostimportantsuccessfactorsof
inter-organisationalrelationships(Blomqvist2002;).Itcanleadtothedecrease
oftransactioncosts(Bidault–Jarillo1997),supportthedevelopmentofcollaborativein-
novations(),andcontributetothefirm’soverallcompetitiveness(Barney–
Hansen1994).However,,gettingadeeper
understandingofthesechangescancontributetomoreeffectiverelationshipmanagementand
thecompetitiveadvantageofafirm.
Howtrustinrelationshipsdevelopsovertimehasalreadybeenanalysedusingdifferent
(.,Huang–Wilkinson2014),survey-basedstatisticalanalysis(.,
),ormodelling(.,Ebenhöh–Pahl-Wostl2008)arewidelyusedinpaperson
,dyadicandsituation-specificanalysisofthephe-
nomenonallowsforadeeperunderstanding(Hardin2009).Thispaperprovidesdataonreal
trust-
specifiedafiniteDynamisedTrustGamewith10interconnectediterationsthatmodelsaco-
opetitivecontextoflonger-,weappliedthisgameina
behaviouralexperimentdevelopingadyadicandsituation-specificdatabaseforfurtheranalysis.
Thewaywedynamisedthegameisunique,anditisrelatedtotheconceptualisationof
longer-terminter-
transactionalapproach,wherespecifictransactionsbetweenagentsareindependentfromeach
other(Williamson–Ouchi1981).Insuchcases,thereisnointerconnectednessbetweenex-
changes,,Fordetal.(2003)suggest
aninteractionapproachemphasisingtheinterconnectedandinterdependentcharacterofsub-
–Wootz(1986)consider
(Blau1964),repeatedtrans-
actionsbetweenpartners,weaimedtomodelrelationshipswithseveralinterconnectedtrans-
actions,wherespecificmovesofapartnerareembeddedinthepreviousones.
,agamecanberepeatedinthesame
-relatedresearch(.,Engle-Warnivk–Slonim
2004).SucharepeatedTrustGamecorrespondstotheapproachofdiscreteexchangeepisodes
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ActaOeconomica72(2022)2,231–247233
betweenpartnerswhichhasbeencriticisedbytheresearcherswhoemphasisetheinteraction
approach(.,Gemü).Anotherformofdynamisationoccurswhenmovesofa
proposed.
anddevelopstheunderstandingofourkey,,wepresentthe
methodologyapplied,wespecifythefiniteDynamisedTrustGame,theexperimentanddata
summarisesthepaper’skeycontributions,evaluatesitstheoreticalandpracticalrelevanceand
suggestsfutureresearchdirections.
clusteraroundtwokeyconceptualisations.
Thefirstonesuggeststhattrustisthebeliefortheexpectationofthetrustorregardingthe
intentionsoftheotherparty,thetrustee,,Barney–Hansen
(1994)interprettrustastheconfidenceofthetrustorthatthepartnerwillnotexploithis/her
.(1996)developedsimilarunderstanding,whentheydefinedtrustas
thedegreeofconfidencethatthetrustorhasinthereliabilityofthepartner.
Thesecondconceptualisationunderstandstrustasthewillingnessofthetrustortoacceptto
bevulnerabletoanotherparty().Lewicki–Brinsfield(2015)highlightedthat
trustconceptualisedasabeliefcapturesanimportantfeatureofthetrustee,namelythelevelof
his/hertrustworthiness,,butconceptually
differentfromtrustinterpretedasthewillingnessofthetrustortoacceptvulnerabilityina
concretesituation,,trustisabehavioural
phenomenonthatcanonlybemanifestedinconcreteactions.
Notonlytrust,–Hansen
(1994:176)indicate:“Astheworditselfimplies,anexchangepartneristrustworthywhenitis
another’sexchangevulnerabilities.”Itisthetrustee’sactualbehaviourinasituationofpotential
opportunism,throughwhichhe/shecanprovethisworthiness().
BehaviouralconceptualisationofbothtrustandtrustworthinessdominatesExperimental
()withtwoplayers,A
,trustiscapturedbythebehaviourofplayerA;andtrustworthinessbythebehaviour
oractionofplayerB(Ostrom–Walker2003;).ExperimentalGameTheory
conceptualisesbothtermsasbehaviours,
.(2015:30)
suggested:“…viewingtrustasbehaviour,oneisinferringtrustfromtheobservedbehaviour
comparedtotheotheralternativebehaviours,
choicecannotbeabsolutelyspecifiedunlessweknowwhatotherchoicesoralternativesare
available.”
classicTrustGamedifferentiatespotentialbehavioursofbothplayersaccordingtotheactual
amountofExperimentalCurrencyUnit(ECU)transferredbyaplayertohis/hercounterpart.
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234ActaOeconomica72(2022)2,231–247
PlayerBisconsidered–forexample–astrustworthyonlywhenhis/herreinvestedamount
achievesorexceedsacertainamount,usually80%ofthefundsavailable(.,Changetal.
2010).Basedonthis,allotheractionsofBwouldreflectanon-trustworthybehaviour.
Animportantfeatureofanytrust-relatedsituationisthatthetrustorisinastructurally
vulnerablesituation(Baier1986).He/shecannotbecertainofthetrustee’sactionandhastorely
onthecounterpart’,thetrustor,isstraightfor-
wardbothinaone-shotTrustGameandinrepeatedTrustGamesaswell(Bohnet–Huck2004;
).Inthesegames,thepositionsofthetwoplayersarealwaysthesame:Astarts
thegame,he/sheisinavulnerableposition,’s
vulnerabilitydepends.
However,vulnerabilityisspecialinthedynamisedversionoftheTrustGamediscussedhere.
repetitions,becausewemadeitpossibletoaccumulatethemoneygainedthroughtheprevious
thepayoutfunction1appliedmotivatedcooperationbetweentheplayersthroughoutthefirst9
-interestofbothplayers–supposingtheyarerational
,intheserounds,theplayers’actualmoves(topassacertain
amountofmoneybacktohis/herpartner)representongoingturnsoftrustingandtrustworthy
behaviours,
vulnerablepositionappears,however,inthelast,
appliedpayoutfunction,thelastroundreflectstheclassic,competitivescenariooftheone-shot
TrustGame.
Asmentionedbefore,ExperimentalGameTheoryconceptualisesbothtrustandtrustwor-
thefaith-basedapproachoftrustthatunderstandsitasthefaithorconfidenceofthetrustorthat
thecounterpartwillnotexploitthetrustor’svulnerabilities,eveninsituations,wheresuch
opportunisticbehaviourwouldbepossible(Barney–Hansen1994;Morgan–Hunt1994).As
Cooteetal.(2003:597)putit:“…trustexistswhenonepartyhasconfidenceinthehonesty,
reliability,andintegrityoftheirpartner”.Accordingly,thetrustorwillbewillingtotaketherisk
andactuallyengagehim(her)selfintoatrustingbehaviour,onlywhenhe/shehasconfidencein
,the
perceivedlevelofhis/hertrustworthiness(Lewicki–Brinsfield2015),whichcanbemeasured.
Theactuallevelofperceivedtrustworthinessisconfrontedwiththecharacteristicsofthesitu-
ation(.,risk),anditmightworkasanassetthatguidesbehaviour:
perceivedlevelofthetrustee’strustworthinessisastocktypeofvariable,akindofinventory
(Gillespie–Dietz2009)
tothisconceptualisationwhenitrelatestrusttogovernancemechanisms(Williamson1979).
Basedonthepreviousdiscussion,wedifferentiatedbetweentrustandtrustworthinessas
behaviours(flow)ofthetrustorandthetrustee;butwealsocanconceptualisetrustworthinessas
anassetorstockthatreflectstheperceptionsofthet