公司治理机制与大股东掏空.doc

文档介绍：汕头大学硕士学位论文

公司治理机制与大股东掏空
Abstract
The Chinese economy is undergoing profound changes nowadays. At such a
sensitive stage, the profits of small and medium-sized shareholders are expropriated
by large ones due to the loophole of legal protection for investors, which plagues the
newly born Chinese security market. Through various ways such as self-dealing
transaction, the gigantic shareholders expropriate the dividend of small and
medium-sized ones. Consequently, such practices have jeopardized the sound
development of China’s panies and the security market as a whole.
This paper has especially analyzed the problem of expropriation by large
shareholders of public corporations on small and medium-sized investors and the
influence on the selection of corporate governance mechanism. Through the
qualitative and quantitative analysis, we find how large shareholders expropriate the
panies through the arrangement of corporate governance mechanism. On
the basis of the model, we find that large shareholders prefer to employ less board
members or independent directors. Second, they do not select ‘big four’ to audit.
What is more, they often lure the executives through high salary.
To restraint the expropriation, there used to be two ways:
First, improve the corporate governance which focuses on perfecting the
function of the board of directors.
Second, strengthen the legal protection to minority stock holder from legislation,
the administration of justice and enforcing the law.
Key words:Big shareholder;

Corporate governance; Tunneling; Expropriation

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汕头大学硕士学位论文

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公司治理机制与大股东掏空
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ABSTRACT.......................................................... II
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