文档介绍：原文二:
Pay Enough, Don't Pay Too Much or Don't Pay at All? The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction.
Pouliakas, Konstantinos
The principal-agent model, with its convincing illustration of the trade-off that arises between risk and incentive provision when attempting to align the conflicting interests of two contracting parties, remains central for our understanding of pensation strategies employed by firms (Mirlees, 1976;Holmstrom, 1979). According to the standard model of agency theory, the introduction of financial incentives as part of an agent’s remuneration package will increase his/her productivity, as it is assumed that individuals derive utility from e whilst the exertion of effort entails a utility cost. Importantly, if the additional disutility of higher effort pensated by an adequate wage premium, an implication of the theory is that the marginal utilities of workers under fixed and pensation schemes should be equalized in the long-run. What this implies is that there should be no difference between the job satisfaction of employees receiving ary incentives and those on non-contingent payment arrangements, other things equal.
The above conclusion has been disputed by a psychological (and, increasingly, economics) literature, which has stressed that the incorporation of non-pecuniary motives into the economic paradigm, such as the desire for reciprocation or for engaging in interesting tasks, has important implications for an individual’s motivation and job satisfaction (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al., 1973; Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1986, 1997; Kreps, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). In addition, it has been argued that ‘wrong’ ary incentives may incite dysfunctional behavioural responses by employees (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992; Prendergast, 1999), or have a detrimental effect on employee morale and job security via the inequitable and risky pay distributions that arise as a consequence (Baker et al., 1988).
Once these mechanisms are