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Informativeness, pensation, and the Choice of Inventory Buffer
Baiman, Stanley; Netessine, Serguei; Saouma, Richard
Most of the agency theory work in managerial accounting has studied the relation between performance metric properties ., informativeness, precision, congruity and optimal pensation, holding fixed the firm’s anizational design decisions., hierarchical structure, job assignment, production technology. However, by holding fixed these anizational design choices, one cannot study whether and how they affect the performance metric properties. As Hemmer 1998, 321–322 notes, “the value of a performance measure is determined not simply by its congruity and precision but by its influence on the anizational design Much of the recent theoretical accounting literature has largely plementarities between performance measures anizational design.”
In this study, we expand on Hemmer’s 1998 observation by studying how the informativenessand incentive properties of a performance metric are influenced by one of the firm’anizational design choices—the size of its inventory buffers. The introduction of just-in-time JITand, more generally, lean manufacturing has led to an increased emphasis on controlling and reducing inventory levels. Managerial accounting has responded to this reduction in inventory with new costing techniques such as back flush costing Horngren et al. 2008. However, we show that the choice of inventory buffers has a more subtle effect on the design of the managerial accounting system, in that it affects the informativeness of performance metrics produced by the managerial accounting system.
Similar to our model, Hemmer 1995, 1998 and Gietzmann and Hemmer 2002 examine how different workflow arrangements between agents affect the information available for contracting, and the incentives facing agents. Our work is distinct from these models that do not consider buffer size as one of the principal’s choice vari