文档介绍：摘要
股权激励是公司的所有者对公司管理层及核心技术人员的激励,通过给予他们一定的经济权利,使他们能够以股东的身份参与企业决策﹑分享利润﹑承担风险,从而勤勉尽责地为公司的长期发展服务。现代企业理论和国外实践证明,规范的股权激励对于改善公司治理结构,降低代理成本,提升管理效率,增强公司凝聚力和市场竞争力起到非常积极的作用,与公司管理者实现了双赢的结果。
本文以沪深两市高管人员持股水平在1%(含)以上的85家上市公司为样本,选择股权分置改革已经接近尾声的2006财年为数据窗口,把高管人员持股水平作为外生变量和内生变量,利用普通最小二乘法和两步最小二乘法的研究技巧,分别对高管人员持股水平与公司绩效的相互影响进行了实证分析;同时对股改后执行了股权激励方案的公司进行研究,考察市场对其股权激励方案的反应。
研究结果表明:我与公司绩效之间存在曲线函数关系:在高管人员持股水平低于21%和高于48%的区间内,公司绩效与高管人员持股水平正相关,而在中间的区间上二者负相关,但逆向因果关系不存在(即公司绩效不影响高管人员持股水平);在股票市场上,上市公司公布股权激励方案在初期不会引起明显的市场变动,但在后半段时间里公司的市场表现优于行业平均水平。为上市公司进行股权激励提供了有意义的经验证据,从而丰富现有的上市公司股权激励的相关文献。
关键词:高管人员持股公司绩效股权激励股权分置改革累计超额收益率
Abstract
Stock ownership incentive is the one given by the owners panies to the management and the core technicians, by giving them some economical rights, making them participate in the process of decision-making, profit-sharing, risk-taking, to serve panies targeting at the long-run development. The modern corporate theories and the practices show that the normative ownership incentive could play a pretty positive role in improving corporate governance structure, reducing proxy cost, upgrading management efficiency, panies’ cohesion and petence, and lead to the win-win consequences with the managers.
This paper selects a sample of 85 panies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges with the managerial ownership level equal to or greater than 1%, taking the cross-sectional data in fiscal year 2006 when the Reform of Non-tradable Shares is going to be finished, using the managerial ownership as exogenous and endogenous variable, respectively, utilizing the research techniques of OLS and 2SLS, to conduct the empirical analysis on the reciprocity of managerial ownership and firm’s performance; Moreover, we examine a pany which has carried out its ownership incentive plan after the Reform of Non-tradable Shares, to find the market’s response to its plan.
The results show that the relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance is a significant cur