文档介绍：Corporate Criminal Law anization
Incentives: A Managerial Perspective∗
Nuno GAROUPA†
Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Spain
November 2000
Abstract
Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the eco-
nomic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from
other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individ-
uals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of
sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil?
This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First,
it provides mon analytical framework to most results presented
and largely discussed in the field. In second place, by making use of
the framework, we provide new insights into how corporations should
be punished for the mitted by their employees.
Keywords: law enforcement, corporation
JEL classification: K4.
∗Financial support by CICYT (grant SEC99-1191-C02-01) is gratefully acknowledged.
The usual disclaimers apply.
†Department d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Ramon Trias Far-
gas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain. Email: nuno.******@; Phone: +34-93-
5422639; Fax: +34-93-5421746
1
1 Introduction
In the United States, but generally not in Europe, firms are criminally liable
for mitted by their employees within the scope of the firm and to
its benefit. The nature of corporate prises essentially fraud (usually
against the government), environmental violations, and antitrust violations
(Cohen, 1996).
Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economics of
enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these
crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or
both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be
criminal or civil?
This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it pro-
vides mon analytical framework to most results presented and largely
discussed in the field. I