文档介绍：Law, Property Rights, and Growth1
Stijn Claessens
(University of Amsterdam and CEPR)
and
Luc Laeven
(World Bank)
May 2001
Abstract
This paper investigates how different legal frameworks not only affect the amount
of external financing available, but also the allocation of resources among different type
of assets. Using a simple model, we show that a firm will get less financing, and thus
invest less, in a weak law and order environment. We also show that weaker property
rights can lead to an asset substitution effect with firms investing less in intangible assets.
Empirically, these two effects appear to be equally important drivers of growth in sectoral
value added for a large number of countries. Using individual firm data, we also show
that weaker legal frameworks are associated with relatively more fixed assets, but less
long-term financing for a given amount of fixed assets.
JEL Classifications: G31, G32, K10, O34, O4

1 The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank. Paper
prepared for the Third Annual Conference on Financial Market Development in
Emerging and Transition Economies, Hong Kong, June 28-30, 2001.
“Economic growth will occur if property rights make it worthwhile to undertake
socially productive activity”
Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas2
1. Introduction
Recently, a large number of papers have established that financial development fosters
growth and that financial development is related to a country’s institutional
characteristics, including a strong legal framework. This law and finance literature has
found that firms in countries with well-developed financial markets and a strong legal
framework find it easier to attract (long-term) financing for their investment needs (La
Porta et al. 1998, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Related work has established that debt structures of firms differ across institutional
frameworks (Rajan and Zingales