文档介绍：ARY POLICY MITTEE: CONSENSUS,
CHAIRMAN DOMINANCE, OR SIMPLE MAJORITY?∗
ALESSANDRO RIBONI AND FRANCISCO J. RUGE-MURCIA
This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of ary
policy making mittee under four different voting protocols. The protocols
are a consensus model, where a supermajority is required for a policy change;
an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; a dictator
model, where the chairman has absolute power over mittee; and a sim-
ple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These
protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision-making pro-
cess and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central
banks. The models are estimated by maximum likelihood using interest rate de-
cisions by mittees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada,
the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and
the . Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the con-
sensus model fits actual policy decisions better than the alternative models.
This suggests that despite institutional differences, committees share unwrit-
ten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy
decisions.
“I try to forge a consensus . . . . If a discussion were to lead to a narrow majority,
then it is more likely that I would postpone a decision.”
Wim Duisenberg, former President of the European Central Bank,
The New York Times, 27 June 2001.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important question in economics concerns the implica-
tions of collective decision making on policy es. Prominent
examples of decisions made by a group of individuals, rather than
by a single agent, include fiscal and ary policy. Decisions
concerning public spending, taxation, and debt are made by
legislatures,1 whereas the target for the key nominal interest
rate is selected by mittee in most central banks.
∗We received ment