天津大学PPT模板.ppt

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目录
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Model
Repair Process and Inventory Policy
Cost Structure
Information Structure
Contract Types and Payoffs
Signaling Game
4. Benchmark: First-Best plete Information
5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory
Resource-Based Contract
Performance-Based Contract
6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory
Resource-Based Contract
Performance-Based Contract
7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies
Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability
Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers
8. Conclusions
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1. Introduction
供货商
买方
产品
PBC
RBC
可靠性
私有信息
使用
备用库存
维护
背景介绍
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文献回顾
2. Literature Review
PBC for outsourced services
asymmetric information in operations management
the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism
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建模
3. Model
Repair Process and Inventory Policy
N: identical copies;
B: inventory backorder;
s: inventory;
The expected backorders in steady state is
Availability is equal to
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建模
Cost Structure
Each time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r ≥ 0.
The buyer’s expected cost is equal to
The vendor’s expected cost is equal to
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建模
Information Structure
We assume that the product offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability.
Hazard rate ordering(危险率序):
Excess wealth ordering(剩余财富序):
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建模
Contract Types and Payoffs
We can write the buyer’s expected payoff as
The vendor’s expected payoff is given by
RBC:
PBC:
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建模
Signaling Game
We assum