文档介绍：摘要

中央银行独立性(CBI,Central Bank Independence)通常就是指中央银行
在履行货币职能时的独立性。中央银行发出的货币政策信号是否正确,能否得到
有效贯彻,除取决于中央银行自身的货币政策决策能力外,还在相当程度上取决
于中央银行能否独立地根据宏观经济的变化进行货币政策决策。因而,中央银行
独立性已成为货币政策能得以有效发挥作用的必要因素之一,这也是为什么近些
年来世界上出现了强化中央银行独立性的新趋向。
这一时期正值中国推行改革开放政策,特别是近年来利率市场化程度不断提
高、汇率体制更趋灵活、外汇储备不断增加的形势下,增强我国宏观经济政策有
效性更凸显其必要性,这就要求我们必须重视国际经验并重新审视我国中央银行
的独立性问题。
但在考察他国中央银行独立性的制度选择时,我们能够发现,把这些模式直
接移植到中国的金融体系和制度建设中,将是很不可取的。
本文在对世界上关于央行独立性的主要理论与实证研究进行考察的基础上,
将设计适合我国情况的央行独立性测度体系,以探讨我国央行独立性的完善进
程,并探求我国的央行独立性与我国的经济绩效之间的关系。以我国的经验研究
作为基础,才能判断中国到底应不应该有一个独立的中央银行,进而选择出具体
的独立模式。

关键词:中央银行独立性,CBI 指标体系,通货膨胀,CBI 模式
I
Abstract

Generally, Central Bank Independence(CBI) refers to the ability of central
bank to decide ary policy itself. Whether the ary policy signal is
right, and whether the policy can be carried out in effect depends not only on the
central bank’petence, but quite on whether central bank is able to make
ary policy according to the macro-economic movement independently. As a
result, CBI has been indispensable to the effectiveness of macro policy. And, this
is why it has appeared a new trend to intensify the CBI in recent years.
In this period, China has been pursuing the reform opening up policy.
Performance of China’s macro policy has manifested itself a necessity, especially
in the situation that interest rate is more and more market-oriented, exchange
rate system is more and more flexible, and foreign exchange reserve is
persistently increasing in China. This case requires us to attach importance to
international experience and re-analyze China’s CBI.
However, while reviewing the CBI system choice of other countries, we can
find that it is not advisable to graft these patterns whole onto China’s finance
structure and system construction.
This paper will frame a CBI measurement which suit China’s situation, on
the basis of study on CBI theory and evidence, in order to probe the progress of
China’s CBI and the relation bet