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Biology and Philosophy 19: 459–472, 2004.
© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in herlands.
Evolutionary Psychology, Human Universals, and the
Standard Social Science Model
NEIL LEVY
Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Department of Philosophy, University of
Melbourne, Parkville, 3010, Australia; E-mail: ******@
Received 19 February 2003; accepted 28 July 2003
Key words: Evolutionary psychology, Game theory, Human universals, Standard Social
Science Model, Social norms
Abstract. Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of human universals
to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. If the same social norms are found in
culture after culture, we have good reason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this
paper I propose an alternative explanation for the existence of human universals, which does
not depend on them being the product of inbuilt psychological adaptations. Following the
work of Brian Skyrms, I suggest that if a particular convention possesses even a very small
advantage petitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we should expect it to
e the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages are translated into very large basins
of attraction, in the language of game theory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence
for innate psychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence of universals is
consistent with the so-called Standard Social Science Model, I turn to a consideration of the
evidence, to show that this style of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation,
at least with regard to patterns of gender inequality.
Introduction
For many of its adherents, evolutionary psychology (EP) holds out the
promise of bringing the study of humanity within the ambit of science. It
will, they claim, do for psychology, and related disciplines, what the scientific
revolution did for astronomy and mechanics: take