文档介绍：Maps of Bounded Rationality:
Psychology for Behavioral Economicst
By DANIEL KAHNEMAN*
The work cited by the mittee was hopes have been realized to some extent, giving
done jointly with Amos Tversky (1937-1996) rise to an active program of research by behav•
during a long and unusually close collaboration. ioral economists (Thaler, 2000; Colin Camerer
Together, we explored the psychology of intu• et aI., ing; for other examples, see
itive beliefs and choices and examined their Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).
bounded rationality. Herbert A. Simon (1955, My work with prised three sep•
1979) had proposed much earlier that decision arate programs of research, some aspects of
makers should be viewed as boundedly rational, which were carried out with other collaborators.
and had offered a model in which utility maxi• The first explored the heuristics that people use
mization was replaced by satisficing. Our re• and the biases to which they are prone in vari•
search attempted to obtain a map of bounded ous tasks ofjudgment under uncertainty, includ•
rationality, by exploring the systematic biases ing predictions and evaluations of evidence
that separate the beliefs that people have and the (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973; Tversky and
choices they make from the optimal beliefs and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982). The
choices assumed in rational-agent models. The second was concerned with prospect theory, a
rational-agent model was our starting point and model of choice under risk (Kahneman and
the main source of our null hypotheses, but Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)
Tversky and I viewed our research primarily as and with loss aversion in riskless choice (Kah•
a contribution to psychology, with a possible neman et aI., 1990, 1991; Tversky and Kahne•
contribution to economics as a secondary ben• man, 1991). The third line ofresearch dealt with
efit. We were drawn into the interdisciplinary framing effects and with their implicatio