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Osprey - Duel 37 - King Tiger vs IS-2. Operation Solstice 1945 - (2011).pdf

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文档介绍

文档介绍:KING TIGER
IS-2
Operation Solstice 1945
DAVID R. HIGGINS
© Osprey Publishing •
KING TIGER
IS-2
Operation Solstice 1945
DAVID R. HIGGINS
© Osprey Publishing •
CONTENTS
Introduction 4
Chronology 6
Design and Development 8
Technical Specifications 21
The Strategic Situation 33
batants 41
The Action 52
Statistics and Analysis 71
The Aftermath 76
Bibliography 78
Index 80
© Osprey Publishing •
INTRODUCTION
During the 1920s and 1930s the concept of a heavy “breakthrough” tank was a
common theme in European military thinking, when mechanized and armored
doctrine was in its post-World War I infancy. Throughout this period, former
combatants wrestled with how best to use armor to help avoid repeating the previous
war’s static and wasteful trench warfare. Soviet futurist military thinkers such as
Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky envisioned integrated “mobile groups” spearheaded by
heavy, multi-turreted T-32s and T-35s that had anized into independent units.
Lighter vehicles, operating much like the Russian cavalry during the Russian Civil
War (1917–23), would then be used to quickly push through the breach to initiate
“deep battle” missions to disrupt their adversary’mand, control, and
communications abilities.
Following its proxy participation in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), leading
thinkers in the Red Army refined their views on armor, and while they missed many
of the conflict’s tactical lessons they excelled in the technical arena. The “mobile
fortress” approach with its multitude of guns was seen as flawed and such systems
were replaced with single-turreted designs that emphasized simplicity and reliability:
assets for the large, undeveloped areas in which such vehicles would operate.
Production quantities were also of primary concern and anything that was not
absolutely necessary to achieve this goal was suspect. fort was generally a low
priority in Soviet armor thinking, and fatigue and lessened perf