文档介绍：SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
Eugene F. Fama
University of Chicago
and
Michael C. Jensen
Harvard Business School
******@
Abstract
This paper analyzes the survival anizations in which decision agents do
not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the
literature on large corporations calls separation of “ownership” and “control.”
Such separation of decision and risk bearing functions is mon to
organizations like large professional partnerships, financial mutuals and
nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk bearing functions
survives in anizations in part because of the benefits of specialization
of management and risk bearing but also because of an mon
approach to controlling the implied agency problems. In particular, the contract
structures of all anizations separate the ratification and monitoring of
decisions from the initiation and implementation of the decisions.
© E. F. Fama and M. C. Jensen, 1983
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI, June 1983.
also published in
Foundations anizational Strategy, Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998.
This document is available on the
Social Science work (SSRN) Electronic Library at:
http://papers./sol3/?ABSTRACT_ID=94034
SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL*
Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen
Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVI, June 1983,
and
Foundations anizational Strategy, Michael C. Jensen, Harvard University Press, 1998.
I. Introduction
Absent fiat, the form anization that survives in an activity is the one that
delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price while covering
Our goal is to explain the survival anizations characterized by separation of
“ownership” and “control”—a problem that has bothered students of corporations from
Adam Smith to Berle and Means and Jensen and In more precise language,
we are concerned with the