文档介绍：Naturalism Logicized
Kevin T. Kelly
Department of Philosophy
Carnegie Mellon University
September 24, 2001
1 Introduction
The approach to scientific methodology developed in my recent book The Logic of Reliable
Inquiry (LRI) shares many general features with that summarized in Larry Laudan’s
concurrently published collection of papers Beyond Positivism and Relativism (BPR).
heless, this fact might not be apparent, as my own work emphasizes mathematical
theorems, whereas Laudan’s draws primarily upon historiography. It is, therefore, of some
interest to discuss the extent of the agreement and the significance of the differences. More
generally, the discussion will (I) provide a logical analysis of the instrumental significance
of empirical meta-methodology and (II) redefine the role of logic in a post-positivistic,
naturalized approach to epistemology and scientific method.
2 Normative Naturalism
First, some important points of agreement. (1) We both view methodological principles
as hypothetical imperatives (., methods are mended as means to an end) (BPR
pp. 132-33, LRI p. 3). (2) We both identify an ponent in these hypothet-
ical imperatives (BPR p. 133, LRI p. 5). (3) We agree that hypothetically normative
epistemology is consistent with naturalized epistemology (BPR p. 133). (4) We agree
that aims can be criticized for being unachievable (BPR p. 77, LRI pp. 158-160, p. 190).
(5) We agree that methodological norms should in some sense explain scientific progress
(BPR pp. 138-39). (6) We agree that contemporary norms need not be satisfied by ex-
emplary historical practice. Laudan’s apt term for the position just sketched is normative
naturalism. So far as this description goes, I am also a normative naturalist.
Our agreement does not end there. (7) We agree that the historicist attack on nor-
mative epistemology is founded, to some extent, on persistent positivistic dogmas, (8) we
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both question the normative force of methodological