文档介绍：Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit
Christine M. Korsgaard
Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Spring, 1989), pp. 101-132.
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Sat Nov 3 11:40:33 2007
CHRISTINEM. KORSGAARD Personal Identity and
the Unity of Agency:
A Kantian Response to Parfit
A person is both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of ex-
periences. Utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophers, however, charac-
teristically place a different emphasis on these two aspects of our nature.
The utilitarian emphasizes the passive side of our nature, our capacity to
be pleased or satisfied, and is concerned with what happens to us. Th