文档介绍：lecture 3 Part III Empirical Tests of M&A Performance
Lecture 3
Part III
Empirical Tests of M&A Performance
Note: When the statistical results are not significant, this is stated1>. If not so noted, the results are understood to be statistically significant at least at the 10% level or better. The empirical patterns described below represent our judgments. Individual samples for particular time periods with binations of variables will yield varying results.
?2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston
Issues in Empirical Studies
Tests of alternative theories
Determine whether or not social value is enhanced by mergers
Performance improvements
Relatedness to fundamental technological, economic, regulatory, and other forces taking place in individual industries
Effects on other firms in same industry
Guides to management for merger planning
?2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston
Merger Performance During the Eighties
essful transactions
Targets earn substantial premiums
Mergers — likely to be friendly and for stock
Targets: Positive 20 to 25%
Buyers: Positive 1 to 2%
Tender offers — frequently hostile during the eighties and for cash
Targets: Positive 30 to 40%
Buyers: Negative 1 to 2%
?2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston
Time trend of returns to targets has been upward
Increase in government protection to targets
Development of sophisticated defensive tactics
Opportunity to peting bidders
Event returns to bidding firms decreased over the decades
Total wealth increase from M&As has continued to be positive
?2001 Prentice Hall Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance, 3/e Weston
essful takeovers
Target acquired within five years
Target — premiums higher than initial bids
Initial bidders — zero or negative returns if rival eeds
Targets not acquired within five years
Target — stock pri