文档介绍：: Problems of Philosophy
Prof. Sally Haslanger
October 17, 2001
Personal Identity II
Problem of synchronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two simultaneous person-events events in the life of
the same person?
Problem of diachronic identity for persons: under what conditions are two person-stages stages in the life of a single
person. In particular, what makes a particular person-stage a continuation of me as I am right now?
Background desiderata: an account of personal identity should allow for the possibility of anticipation and memory, ., of
individual psychological connections between different person stages. It should also allow us to justify our practices of
recognizing and identifying persons.
Soul criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same soul.
Or, in the terminology of stages:
Person-stage x is part of the same person as person-stage y iff there is a (single) soul S that is present in both x and
y.
Body criterion: x is the same person as y iff x and y have the same living human body.
Or, in the terminology of stages:
Person-stage x is part of the same person as person-stage y iff x and y are person-stages linked by bodily
continuity (where bodily continuity is understood in terms of the continuity of a living human body).
Sam's criticisms of the body criterion:
i) If I were my