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Financial Control
Effective corporate governance and financial control includes the use of monitoring and incentive mechanisms to align divergent interests between shareholders and managers and encourage the creation of shareholder value. Value-based management systems (VBM) provide an integrated management strategy and financial control system intended to increase shareholder value by mitigating agency conflicts. In concept, VBM reduces agency conflicts and helps create shareholder value since it reveals value-increasing decisions to employees, allows for easier monitoring of managers’ decisions, and provides a method to pensation to es that create shareholder value. However, the degree to which VBM systems actually improve the economic performance of publicly held firms is an open question. To gain insight into this issue, we examine the use and economic efficacy of value-based management systems by 84 firms that adopt VBM systems from 1984 to 1997. We investigate two related research questions: (1) Does the adoption of a VBM system improve economic performance? And (2) What factors enhance or hinder the effectiveness of VBM systems?
Our primary goal is to examine whether the adoption of a VBM system improves economic performance. We recognize that firm performance and the decision to pensation to a VBM metric can be endogenous, which creates a potential sample selection bias. For instance, firms that are performing poorly face tougher challenges to creating economic value and could be more likely to pensation to VBM to provide managers the incentives to e these challenges. Alternatively, managers who expect to achieve a certain level of performance can negotiate pensation contract based on the VBM metric that essentially assures a bonus payout. Our sample includes firms that pensation on VBM metrics, but also firms that use VBM for analysis and evaluation only. Thus, we can examine why firms choose to pensation to VBM, which allows us to control for pote