文档介绍：密级：秘密
学校代码：10075
分类号:
学 号：040223
法学硕士学位论文
企业人力资本投资博弈的理论分析
学位申请人：康晶
指
导
教
师：吕红平
学
位
类
别：法学硕ital, human capital will play a more important role than substantial capital and financial capital. It is vital both for the economic development of the country and for the individual development of the enterprises.
This thesis, first of all, makes an exploration of theories of human capital and the theories of human capital investment, and analyzes the approach and characteristics of human capital investment. By means of the analysis that the ownership of human capital naturally belongs to the carrier, and the investor and the carrier of the human capital are dividable, this thesis believes that it is risky if the enterprises make a human capital investment on their employees. Next, this thesis analyzes various game relations in the human capital investment of enterprises on the basis of game theory and Information Economics. The emphasis is laid on the discussion of the process and causation of the adverse selection in the invitation for the job of the enterprises. Accordingly, this author believes that the traditional education-signaling model is unable to solve the practical problems of out country and put forward to the approach of avoiding the adverse selection, that is, enterprises solve the adverse selection totally through setting up long-effect prompting mechanism and benign reputation mechanism. Thirdly, this thesis analyzes the human capital investment on the manager and common employee respectively. It is beneficial for common employee to undertake the cost of training and to share the good. For the manager, when the dominant prompting effect is of little use, reputation is the vital factor of restriction. Finally, this thesis proposes the countermeasure of building and completing the human capital market, and explores the efficient prompting mechanism, in
Abstract
order to reach the double win between enterprises and employees, to