文档介绍：本科毕业论文外文翻译
外文题目: The Political Economy of the US Crop Insurance Program
出处: The Economic Impact of Public Support to Agriculture
(2010)7:243-308
作者: Bruce 
原文
The Political Economy of the US Crop Insurance Program Abstract:Taxpayer support for the crop insurance industry has grown rapidly since 2000 even though total crop acres insured is stagnant and the number of policies sold has declined. Staunch support for the program by key members of Congress meant defeat for proposals in the 2008 Farm Bill to significantly reduce cost. These proposals included large changes in the formulas used to calculate industry reimbursement and for new programs that would be integrated with or reduce the amount of risk insured by the crop insurance program. The reason for this resilience is plexity and biased analysis, which has allowed the industry to claim that
they are pensated despite a doubling of taxpayer support. One unforeseen e of the strength of the crop insurance industry in protecting its interests is that a new insurance program called Average Crop Revenue Selection (ACRE) was passed in the farm bill. Large unintended consequences that could be brought about by ACRE include the likely demise of the marketing loan and countercyclical programs, increased risk that the United States will violate its amber box limits, and in the not-too-distant future, plete change in the way that US crop insurance is delivered to farmers.
Introduction
The difficulty with which Congress passed a US Farm Bill was hampered more by a need to find increased funds than with any broad philosophical debate about the proper direction for US farm policy. At first perusal, the new modity policy largely follows the policy set forth in the 2002 farm bill. Direct payments, countercyclical
payments, and the marketing loan program still exist and are largely unchanged. Wheat and soybeans have a slightly higher target price and lentils have a slightly lower loan rate. To maintain th